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Trapped Within the System: Abused
Children and Child Protective Service
Agencies
I. Introduction
In the past two decades, child abuse and neglect have emerged
and been recognized as widespread social problems' warranting government intervention.' As the magnitude of the child abuse problem
has increased, the public has demanded that state and federal legis-

lators improve child protective services. Pursuant to this demand legislators in every jurisdiction 2 have enacted reporting statutes.3 In
1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment

Act,4 providing federal financial assistance to states implementing
programs aimed at preventing and treating child abuse and neglect.5

Consequently, many states passed statutes to ensure that their child
protective services conformed to the Act.6
Since states enacted the first child abuse and neglect statutes,
legislative focus has changed from requiring mere reporting of suspected abuse to initiating investigation and intervention proceed1. See generally Antler & Antler, From Child Rescue to Family Protection: the
Evolution of the Child Protective Movement in the United States, CHILDREN AND YOUTH
SERVICES REV. 1 (1979).
2. See Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1967); Paulsen, Parker & Adelman, Child Abuse Reporting Laws Some Legislative History, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482 (1966); Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1966).
3. Reporting statutes, although varying from state to state, generally require physicians, hospitals, teachers and school administrators to report cases of suspected child abuse.
See Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458 (1978).
4. PUB. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 51015106 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 5104(a)-(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The Act allocates available funds
once a state qualifies for them. In order to qualify, a state must: (1) have in effect a child
abuse and neglect reporting law; (2) promptly investigate the accuracy of the report and take
steps to protect the child; (3) demonstrate that the state has administrative procedures, training programs and multidisciplinary services in effect to deal with child abuse; (4) have the
cooperation of courts, law enforcement officials and state agencies; (5) appoint a guardian ad
litem to represent the child in legal proceedings; and (6) provide for public dissemination of
information. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Although the language of the
Act is mandatory, strict compliance is not required in practice. Fraser, A Glance at the Past.
A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse of the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of
Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 641, 643 (1978).
6. Fraser, supra note 5, at 649.

ings. 7 The coalescence of state reporting laws and federal enactments
has charged state, county, and municipal child protective service
(CPS) agencies" with legal responsibilities of investigating reports of
abuse and neglect, often substantiating such reports, and finally assisting the child and the family. Yet despite legislative duties imposed on child welfare agencies to ensure protection, many children

suffer further abuse after their plight has been reported to a child
welfare agency. No one knows precisely how many child abuse fatalities result from administrative breakdowns and judgment mistakes.
Studies indicate that twenty-five percent of all child fatalities arising
from abuse or neglect involve children already reported to a child
protective agency. 9 Tens of thousands of other children sustained serious injury while under the supervision of CPS agencies. 10
Until recently, recurrent malfeasance by child welfare agencies
was attributed to inadequate funding and poor regulation. 1 This
conclusion in turn sparked legislative reform. But increased regulation did not ensure that these problems would be solved. As a result,
civil and even criminal liability of child protective agencies has
emerged1 2 as a powerful deterrent to negligent performance of their
duties. The cost and publicity of holding CPS agencies liable for

their inadequate response to reported child abuse both compensates
the child for suffering and forces agency employees to become more
aware of their responsibilities.

This comment examines the recent expansion in liability of CPS
agencies and their employees when administrative breakdowns lead

to continued abuse or death of a child. This comment also analyzes
various aspects of child protection for which agencies have been held
liable. Finally, it dissects the theories courts recognize to sustain a
cause of action' 3 and projects how far each goes in opening the door
7. Id. at 650.
8. At present, public agencies provide most child protective services. However, some
agencies contractually delegate their duties to private welfare programs. The discussion of
agency liability throughout this comment also applies to private organizations responsible for
child protective services. Some federal courts have held private child care agencies "public in
nature" and, thus, subject to suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Perez v.
Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974).
9. D. BESHAROV. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY IN CHILD WELFARE WORK: THE
GROWING TREND 5 (A.B.A. 1983) (citing Region VI Resource Center on Child Abuse and
26
(1981)); Mayberry, Child Protective Services in New
Neglect, Child Deaths in Texas, p.
10 9
(1979).
York City: An Analysis of Case Management, p.
10. Mayberry, supra note 9, at 105.
11. Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Directions, 17 FAM. L.Q. 151, 164 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Boss, Professional and Agency Liability for Negligence in Child Protection, 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 71 (1983); Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court,
Congress and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 281.
13. Nearly all cases discussed in this comment involve a defendant's motion to dismiss
a complaint. Therefore, the allegations by the plaintiff are untested since the court is deciding
only whether the plaintiff has legal grounds for a claim, provided plaintiff's allegations are

to agency liability.

II. The Emergence of Agency Liability for Inadequate Child
Protection
In order to compel CPS agencies to implement federal and state
programs responsibly, those injured through agency negligence have
sought relief in court. Criminal and civil liability of child welfare
agencies has emerged because of centralization of child protection,
recognition of agency employees as professionals, and increased facilitation of lawsuits against the state.
A.

Centralized Agencies

Prior to enactment of mandatory reporting laws in the 1960s,",
reports of suspected child abuse were handled by a variety of
groups. 5 Reports could be forwarded to either a police agency, a
public assistance agency, or one of the few CPS agencies in existence. Any agency receiving a report of suspected abuse could in
turn refer it to one of the other agencies. Furthermore, schools, hospitals, social service agencies and community service organizations
could report to any one of these agencies or go directly to court and
file a child protective petition. 6
With reports shuffled from agency to agency, important information concerning the child's safety often did not reach the appropriate agency. This patchwork of efforts left no one agency responsible for protecting the child,'" and all too often resulted in the child's
death.' 8 Even cases initially accepted for investigation and checked
into were often subsequently ignored.
Because of staff shortages and limited accountability, pending
cases accumulated and were left untouched on caseworkers desks.' 9
Workers tried to screen cases, giving priority to the most urgent situations. The protective staff in one western state, for example, accumulated a total of 140 uninvestigated pending cases. Three typical
case files from this total included two general reports of neglect and
one physician's report of severe malnutrition. This last case had still
true.
14. See supra note 2.
15. Besharov, supra note 9, at 2.
16. Horowitz & Davidson, Improving the Legal Response of Child Protective Service
Agencies, 6 VT. L. REv. 381, 382 (1981).
17. C. HELFER & R. KEMPE, THE BATTERED CHILD, editor's note to Chapter 2 (2d ed.
1974).
18. For example, a New York legislative study revealed that in 1971 75% of child
abuse fatalities involved child abuse victims previously reported to authorities. New York State
Assembly Select Committee on Child Abuse Report ii-v (April 1972), reprinted in C. KEMPE
& R. HELFER, THE BATrERED CHILD (2d ed. 1974).
19. Besharov, supra note 11 at 156.

not been investigated six months after the report had been filed. 20
States were slow to address these problems inherent in their
child protective programs. It was not until 1974 that federal efforts
culminated in enactment of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. 2 This Act directed the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare2 2 to establish a National Center on Child Abuse to
serve as a clearinghouse for research and information about child
protective programs. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Act
was its development of a state grant program2 3 which required states
24
to establish comprehensive reporting and investigatory programs.
Although in 1973 only three states met the eligibility requirements, 25
state legislators rapidly passed laws setting up new child protective
systems which would qualify for federal aid. By 1978, forty-three
states had comprehensive child protective systems.26
Accordingly, child protection changed from fragmented efforts
of numerous state agencies to the more focused duties of a specialized child protective agency. At the same time, this change created a
legal entity that could be held responsible for inadequate protection.
The duties of a public welfare agency included investigating reports
of suspected child abuse and intervening to protect the child. Lawsuits brought against child protective agencies provided not only a
means of compensation for those injured or killed as a result of
agency malfeasance, but also provided a way to force CPS agencies
to implement their duties responsibly. The undesired publicity and
cost accompanying a judicial finding of agency negligence are powerful deterrents to inadequate performance of agency duties. Individually, no agency employee wants to face the repercussions of prosecution for negligent performance of his job. Thus, centralization of
child protection services increased agency liability.
B.

Agency Employees as Professionals

Agency liability also increased because caseworkers began to be
regarded more as professionals than as mere bureaucrats.
Caseworker liability can be analogized to liability of other profes20. Id. at 156.
21. See supra note 5.
22. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare is now known as the Department of Health and Human Services.
23. Title XX of the Social Security Act also provided the states with supplementary
funds. States were allowed a 75% federal reimbursement for increases in their child protective
staff. See BENTON, FIELD & MILLER, SOCIAL SERVICES: FEDERAL LEGISLATION V. STATE IMPLEMENTATION 72 (1978) (finding that the majority of state administrators and federal staff
believed that Title XX had the most positive impact on children's protective services).
24. See supra note 5.
25. Besharov, supra note 11, at 158.
26. Id.

sionals such as physicians and teachers for failure to report suspected abuse.17 During the 1960s, when public interest centered on
the problems of child abuse, state legislatures responded by enacting
laws requiring physicians, teachers and other professionals to report

suspected abuse.28 Legislators were convinced that such professionals
were uniquely able to spot abused children and to evaluate their in-

juries. The threat of civil liability imposed through common law or
statutory negligence theories 29 would promote more responsible be-

havior on the part of professionals.3
Recently, agency employees have been included in this category

of responsible professionals in the child welfare system.31 Like teachers and physicians, caseworkers aptly can investigate and monitor

child abuse. Furthermore, caseworkers-like other professionals-must adhere to both statutory and common law duties.12 Finally, imposing civil liability for a caseworker's failure to adequately
investigate and monitor reported child abuse accordingly increases
responsibility in child protection.
Extending civil liability to caseworkers as professionals is part

of a general trend toward holding professionals responsible for their
decisions.3

California34

The decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of

is the most controversial indication of this trend. In

Tarasoff, a psychotherapist was held liable for his failure to warn a

victim that one of his patients intended to cause her serious harm. 6
The court held that when a therapist knows or, according to the profession's standards, has reason to know that a patient presents a seri27. See generally Aaron, Civil Liability For Teacher's Negligent Failure To Report
Suspected Child Abuse, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 183 (1981); Brown & Truitt, Civil Liability for
Failure to Diagnose and Report Child Abuse, 54 CHI.-]KENT L. REV. 753 (1978); Mazura,
Negligence-Malpractice-Physician'sLiability for Failure to Diagnose and Report Child
Abuse, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 1187 (1977).
28. Between 1963 and 1965, all 50 states and the District of Columbia enacted laws
requiring physicians and other professionals to report suspected abuse. See Kohlman, Malpractice Liability for Failing to Report Child Abuse, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 119, 120 (1974).
29. See, e.g., Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal.3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1976) (court found a physician's failure to comply with a state criminal siatute making failure to report suspected abuse a misdemeanor constituted negligence per se).
30. Reporting: Failure to Report Suspected Cases of Child Abuse, 6 AM. JuR. PROOF
OF FACTS 2d 345, 354 (1975). One author has suggested that private damage actions against
physicians may be the sole means of securing widespread compliance with reporting statutes.
See Kohlman, supra note 28, at 121.
31. Besharov, supra note 9, at 2.
32. Although the statutory duties of agencies vary from state to state, the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act provides some national uniformity for states in constructing
their statutes. See supra note 5. Courts have also found common law duties for which agencies
have been held liable. See infra text accompanying notes 75-86.
33. Besharov, supra note 9, at 2.
34. 17 Cal.3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14.
35. After the patient informed the therapist of his intention to kill the young woman,
the therapist contacted the police. The police questioned the patient and subsequently released
him. Even though the therapist made these efforts to counter the patient's threats, the court
found an unfulfilled duty to inform the intended victim. Id.

ous danger to a third party, the therapist has a duty to use reasonable care to protect the intended victims. The importance of Tarasoff
for CPS agency employees is its expanded notion of professional
duty, because the court was willing to recognize a duty where none
existed before. Although this principle has been limited by subsequent decisions,3 6 it exemplifies the general trend toward holding
professionals liable for their decisions.
C.

Increase in Government Liability

The increased liability of child protective agencies is also part of
a general legislative and judicial trend facilitating lawsuits against
the state. The abrogation of sovereign immunity 37 and the expansion
of federal civil rights litigation3 8 have caused a corresponding in-

crease in litigation against the state. 39 States are no longer completely immune from liability for tortious acts by their individual
agents. The expansion of state agency liability under state tort law
mirrors expanded liability under section 1983 of the Federal Civil
Rights Act.40 These trends have created new opportunities for successful litigation against the state.

III. Areas of Liability
A.

Failure to Investigate

Agencies have been prosecuted for negligent conduct in all aspects of child protection work. State law requires all agencies to initiate investigations pursuant to reports of suspected abuse on the
same day the reports are received or shortly thereafter."1 A
caseworker can choose to reject a report, but such discretionary deci-

sions are rare. Because a report need only convey a reasonable basis
for suspecting abuse,' 3 a caseworker must have sufficient grounds for

rejecting the report."3

36. See, e.g., Bellah v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App.3d 890, 893, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92, 95
(1977) (court limited duty to warn to situations where there is risk of violent assault as opposed to risk of self-inflicted harm or harm to property); Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. 718, 415
A.2d 625, 630-31 (1980) (court found no duty to warn where the therapist was dealing with a
group psychotherapy program).
37. See infra note 87.
38. The Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), establishes a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, causes an individual to suffer a
constitutional deprivation. See infra notes III and 112.
39. Besharov, supra note 9, at 2.
40. Since the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Monell v. Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), individuals may sue local governments under section
1983.
41. Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and
Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458, 495 (1978).
42. Id. at 471.
43. Reports may be rejected if, for example, the allegations clearly fall outside the

Although failures to investigate reports are not common, the decision in Mammo v. Arizona" demonstrates that potential for liability exists. In Mammo, a father reported that he found bruises on two
of his children during visitation, and that their mother would not
allow him to visit his infant. The agency failed to investigate the
report, and the infant died ten days later. The father successfully
pursued a wrongful death action and received $300,000 in
damages.'
B. Failure to Investigate Adequately
Even when an agency responds to a report of abuse, it may negligently conduct its investigation46 or fail to place a child in protective custody.' 7 Courts have held state social workers criminally liable
for inadequate performance of these official duties. In Steinberger v.
District Court in and for the Tenth District,'4 a caseworker and her
supervisor were charged with failure to respond adequately to reported abuse. The child had been in foster care and was returned
home. While the caseworker was on part-time leave, the agency received calls from the school to report large burns, cuts, and bruises
on the child. Neither the caseworker nor her supervisor attempted to
visit the child and verify the reports. After the child died, the
caseworker and her supervisor were convicted under a criminal
statute."
Although no caseworker has yet been criminally convicted for
failure to investigate adequately reports of abuse, the possibility of
criminal charges is a deterrent for all agency employees. Courts are
unlikely to expand criminal liability for CPS agency employees,
since criminal liability is a harsh reprimand for an employee who
was negligent on the job. On the other hand, awareness of criminal
prosecutions may frighten CPS employees into increased compliance
with agency policies and guidelines.
agency's definitions of child abuse or neglect, if the caller cannot provide sufficient information
to identify or locate the child, or if specific evidence of malice exists. Besharov, supra note 9,

at 7.
44.
45.
46.
amounted

No. C-391550 (Maricopa County Super. Ct., Ariz., Sept. 19, 1980).
id.
See, e.g., Buege v. Iowa, No. 20521 (Allamakee, Iowa, July 30, 1980) (settlement
to $82,500 where agency investigated and substantiated reported abuse but failed to

make follow-up visits, and child subsequently died).
47. For example, a complaint filed in the Federal District Court of Missouri alleged
that a caseworker failed to remove a two-year-old child from a home when she witnessed, over
a five-month period, the child's weight drop from 23 pounds to 13 pounds. Basharov, supra
note 9, at 10.
48. 198 Colo. 59, 596 P.2d 755 (1979).
49. Both convictions were subsequently overturned upon finding the official misconduct
statute void for vagueness. People v. Beruman, 638 P.2d 789, 794 (Colo. 1982).

C. Failure to Place in Protective Custody
Caseworkers must decide, based on their investigations, whether

a child is in such imminent danger that protective custody is required. 50 The decision is difficult, and the consequences of making an
error in judgment are harsh - unnecessarily placing a child in foster care and severing parental rights,51 or wrongly deciding against

foster care when a child is in serious danger. However, courts have
held CPS agency employees liable for overlooking or ignoring signs
of serious danger to a child and for failing to remove the child from
the abusive environment.
In 1980, caseworkers and their supervisors in two states were

prosecuted for criminal negligence in failing to place abused children
in protective custody. In Kentucky, agency employees decided to
close a case despite numerous reports of suspected abuse.52 The child
died of burns shortly thereafter. The charges were dismissed, how-

ever, because of negligence on the part of other agencies." In Texas,
three protective service agency employees were charged with criminal negligence when, despite hospital reports of severe burns, they
did not remove the abused child from her home. 54 The child died

subsequently. A month before the trial was to commence, the court
quashed the indictments on all counts, finding that no indictable offense had been charged.55
D.

Inadequate Foster Care

Most agency liability litigation arises from alleged inadequate
foster care." CPS agency employees are faced with a difficult choice
in deciding whether to remove a child from his natural home. But
once an agency decides to remove a child and place him in a foster
home, the agency's responsibilities increase, as does its potential lia50. Child protection workers have great discretion to decide when it is appropriate to
petition a court to award custody of the child to the state. Once the worker files the petition,
the court may order the child's removal from his natural home. A worker may also remove a
child without prior judicial approval if the worker determines that an emergency exists. Wald,
State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: Standards for Removal of Children from
their Homes. Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care and Termination of Parental
Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 628-36 (1976).
51. Id.
52. Casper & Hutchinson, CPS Indictments in Ky. and their Aftermath, 4 NAT'L
CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES NEWSLETTER 6 (1981).
53.
Apparently, hospital physicians failed more than once to report treatment of the
child. The judge found that since several agencies and numerous employees had caused the
inadequate protection, it was unfair to charge the two caseworkers with criminal violations. Id.
54. Horowitz & Davidson, Improving the Legal Response of Child Protective Service
Agencies, 6 VT. L. REV. 381, 384 (1981).
55. id.
56. Foster care includes all state supervised placement of children, whether in institutional settings or in family homes.

bility. 57 One scenario typical of such cases illustrates why public outcry has been strongest in this area:
Anna was placed in the legal custody of the New York Department of Social Services when she was two years old. At age
three, she was put in a foster home by the Catholic Home Bureau, which had been delegated the responsibility of supervising
her foster placement. As part of its decision to certify the foster
home in which Anna was placed, the Bureau prepared a report,
approving the foster parents as "reliable, helpful and endowed
with Christian charity." By age ten, Anna was regularly beaten
and sexually abused by her foster father. He threw her down
stairs, whipped her repeatedly with a belt, lacerated her with a
hunting knife, confined her to her room for days at a time and
forced her to have sexual relations with him. In order to prevent
discovery of her injuries, Anna's foster father withdrew her from
school and threatened to institutionalize her if she disclosed his
actions to anyone.
Although the Catholic Home Bureau was charged by state
law with periodically inspecting and annually recertifying the
foster home, several years went by without a visit from Bureau
personnel. When caseworkers did check up on the foster placement, they interviewed Anna only in the presence of her foster
father and gave the home a favorable rating in spite of suspicions of child abuse. The Bureau was notified of Anna's removal
from school and had been given psychiatric reports indicating
that she was being sexually molested, yet the Bureau failed to
protect Anna from continued abuse. At age sixteen, three years
after strong evidence of child abuse had been revealed to the
Bureau, Anna was removed from-lnhe foster home. Anna had
been abused for over seven years while under the protective custody of the state of New York."
In the past decade, national attention has focused increasingly
on the failures of the foster care system. 59 The advent of reporting
laws brought a corresponding increase in the number of children
placed in foster care.6" Presently, there are nearly one-half million
57. See, e.g., Vonner v. State, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973); Elton v. County of Orange, 3
Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970); Bartels v. County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517,
429 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1980).
58. Doe v. County of Suffolk, 494 F. Supp. 1979 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
59. In the past ten years, numerous articles have been written analyzing the foster care
system. See Children's Defense Fund, Children Without Homes: An Examination of Public
Responsibility to Children in Out-of-Home Care (1978); National Commission on Children in
Need of Parents, Who Knows? Who Cares? (1979); Musewicz, The Failure of Foster Care:
Federal Statutory Reform and the Child's Right to Performance, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 633
(1981); Comment, Foster Placement Review: Problems and Opportunities, 83 DICK. L. REV.
487 (1979).
60. U.S. Nat'l Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Nat'l Study of the Incidence and
Severity of Child Abuse and Neglect, (DHHS 1981).

children under foster care in the United States.6 ' Most frequently,
children are placed in foster care because a court or social service
agency has determined that the child was abused or neglected.62 Unfortunately, sometimes deprivation and abuse faced by children
under foster care is even more egregious than the original mistreatment from which the agency is claiming to protect them. Anna and
those who have suffered similar cruelties from inadequate foster care
services have sought remedy for these harms by suing the CPS
agencies.
The many suits brought against agencies in this area of child
protection result in part from the fact that abuse of foster children
remains largely unchecked.63 Although the federal government recently enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
198064 - aimed at improving foster care services - it failed to designate any specific programs.65 The Act contains a foster care review
provision which requires states to conduct a review of foster care
placement through a court or administrative body. Theoretically,
states will not receive matching funds if they fail to implement programs. However, there is no assurance that agencies and their employees will comply. Furthermore, the requisite standards described
in the Act provide minimal protection for foster children. Even when
agency regulations call for extensive monitoring of foster children,
supervision of foster care is often sporadic and sometimes nonexistheir own regutent.66 Agency employees frequently do not abide by
67
so.
do
to
incentive
little
have
they
lations because
Furthermore, few avenues of redress are open for children left
unprotected by the foster carat,system. Regulations and administrative procedures provide little recourse, and, usually, a child has no
access to any grievance mechanism." Legal advocates for foster children are rarely accessible. The children, even if old enough to ex61. Besharov, supra note 11, at 167.
62. "Abuse" and "neglect," usually defined by state statute, reflect the point at which
the care provided by the natural parents is considered sufficiently inadequate for the state to
take action. Abuse generally covers physical and emotional injury and denotes the commission
of an act. Neglect occurs if parents fail to provide for a child's physical or emotional needs and
is generally an omission. Bourne, Child Abuse and Neglect: An Overview, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE 1, 2 (R. Bourne & E. Newberger eds. 1979).
63. Besharov, supra note 11, at 168.
64. PUB. L. No. 96-272, codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. The Act amended
the AFDC foster care program which is operated under Title IV-A of the federal Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
65. The legislation merely promulgates minimum guidelines states must follow in operation of their foster care programs in order to qualify for certain federal funds. 42 U.S.C.A. §
627, 671(a) (West Supp. 1980).
66. See C. ROSE, SOME EMERGING ISSUES IN LEGAL LIABILITY OF CHILDREN'S AGENCIES

(1978).
67.
68.

Id.

Id.

press their own views, are largely denied a voice in dependency proceedings and placement into foster homes or institutions. 9 Those
children fortunate enough to have been represented by attorneys in
the proceedings which lead to their foster placement have no subsequent contact with an attorney. 7 Even when a foster child has contacted a lawyer, further obstacles such as inaccessibility to the
child's files or even to the child may hinder redress.7 When children
or their survivors finally bring lawsuits against a CPS agency, they
provide a necessary incentive for better foster care services.
IV.

Theories of Liability

Liability for inadequate child protective service is largely
founded upon negligence theories. Both common law and statutory
negligence theories have provided a basis for a cause of action.
Courts have recently begun to consider a new avenue of redress
based on section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 72 Section 1983 grants
those seeking redress an alternative theory on which to base a claim
of liability. An examination of the strengths and weaknesses of these
two theories reveals the difficulty victims face in attempting to hold
agencies responsible for malfeasance or nonfeasance.
A.

Negligence

Most actions brought against agencies for inadequate child protective services have been founded upon the theory of negligence. In
order to sustain a cause of action based on negligence, the plaintiff
must show that a common law or statutory duty existed which the
agency failed to perform and which proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. 73 The breach of duty and the injury to the plaintiff generally are not difficult to prove. The element of proximate cause as
well as the defense of sovereign immunity 74 are the toughest hurdles
a plaintiff must leap in establishing a cause of action under the theory of negligence.
1. Establishing the Cause of Action. - In general, courts
have charged agencies with a duty of ordinary care in the implemen69. A few states allow the children to participate, through independent counsel, as parties in dependency proceedings. But, as a practical matter, children's preferences are often
ignored. Id. at 21. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has refused to recognize a
constitutional right for children to participate in dependency proceedings. Smith v. Offer, 431
U.S. 852 (1977).
70. Besharov, supra note 11, at 168.
71. Id.
72. See infra notes 111 and 112.
73. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
74. See infra note 87.

tation of child protective services.75 Courts have found the origin for
an agency's duty of due care in both common law and statutory law.
Most frequently, the agency has blatantly exposed its negligent actions or omissions by failing to comply with state statutes or agency
regulations.7 6 Courts have found this failure probative of negligence,
but have not recognized such failure as negligence per se.
The court in Bartel v. County of Westchester7 articulated both
the common law and statutory bases for this duty. In Bartel, the
representative of a three-year-old child brought action against the
county for negligent placement and supervision of the child under
foster care. The foster parents had carelessly scalded the child while
bathing her. The court reasoned that the state had a duty to the
child defined by both state law and common law. New York statu7 8
tory law considered the state to be the parens patriae
of the child
and, thus, charged it with the responsibility of supervising the foster
home and removing the child if necessary. The court held that apart
from the statutory duty creating liability, the agency could be sued
for breach of its common law duty. The court cited a well established common law principle that one assuming to act, although not
under a duty, must act with care, especially when caring for children.7 9 Since the agency undertook the duty of protecting the infant,
that duty, once assumed, had to be carried out with due care. 80
Some courts look beyond duties enumerated in statutes and regulations and define the scope of an agency's responsibilities in
broader terms of common law. In Vonner v. State,8 1 a suit was
brought by a child's mother against the state Department of Welfare
for its negligence in failing to monitor foster parents who later eventually killed the child. Four foster children had been placed in the
Vonner home. Despite the fact that the two oldest children had run
away, complaining of continuous beatings by their foster parents,
welfare workers failed to investigate the complaints thoroughly, as
required by departmental rules. Specifically, the department failed
to submit the two younger children to a yearly medical examination
and failed to make regular visits to the foster home every two
months. 82 The youngest child eventually died from physical abuse.
75. See, e.g., Bradford v. Davis, 290 Or. 855, 626 P.2d 1376 (1981) (court recognized
cause of action for an agency's failure to exercise ordinary care in discharge of statutory duty).
76. See, e.g., Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970)
(court sustained cause of action against a county for its failure to comply with regulations
governing dependent children and foster homes).
77. 76 A.D.2d 517, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1980).
78. Parenspatriae refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian

of persons under legal disability.
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79. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 18.6 at 1044-46 (1956).
80. Bartels v. County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1980).
81. 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973).
82.

Id.

In Vonner, the court recognized the department's negligent
compliance with its own regulations but found that the department's
duty rested on a broader base. Once the department took custody of
the child, the court held that it was under a duty of due care to
provide for that child's well-being. Indeed, the scope of the department's liability was not limited to compliance with its own regulations but rather was defined by general principles of tort liability.
As exemplified by Bartel and Vonner, courts generally derive an
agency's duty to provide reasonable care from common law or statutory law. Courts next consider when the duty arises. Although courts
have recognized an existent duty at various stages of child protection, they have been most willing to uphold the duty once the agency
has taken custody and placed a child in foster care. Courts have refused to allow agencies to delegate this duty of due care to foster
parents or others who temporarily care for the children on behalf of
the state.
The court in Andrews v. Courts of Ostego8 3 held that when an
agency obtains custody of a child, it becomes directly responsible for
the child's care and well-being. Thus, the court held that the agency
could not insulate itself from responsibility by delegating that responsibility to others. This rationale is espoused frequently by courts
dealing with an agency's inadequate supervision of foster care. 84
Once a plaintiff has established an agency's breach of a duty,
the plaintiff must then show a proximately caused injury. The injury
and damage elements of liability are undeniable because of the
child's injuries or death. 85 Finally, courts impose liability only for
abuse sustained after the agency's negligent acts or omissions. 86
2. Barriers to Establishing Negligence.-A plaintiff can frequently establish the breach of a common law or statutory duty
which resulted in injury. Yet, the plaintiff may find the court reluctant to hold that the agency's negligence proximately caused the
damage. Another significant problem a plaintiff may encounter is the
defendant's claim of sovereign immunity 87 traditionally granted governmental agencies. These two barriers keep all but the most obvious
83. 446 N.Y.S. 2d 169 (Sup. Ct. Ostego Co. 1982).
84. See, e.g., Vonner v. State, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973).
85. The law of negligence requires proof of actual loss or damage to the interest of
another. PROSSER, supra note 73, at 143.
86. Id. at 144-46.
87. The doctrine of governmental immunity is based on common law and holds that the
government cannot be sued without its consent. In 1946, the United States waived its immunity from liability in tort by authorizing litigation of tort claims against it in the federal courts,
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411,
2412, 2671-2680 (1948). Likewise, all states have consented to suit via state tort claims statutes. PROSSER, supra note 73, at § 131.

cases of agency negligence out of court.
a. Governmental Immunity.-Even if a plaintiff establishes
the elements constituting a cause of action for negligence, the claim
may still be frustrated by the defense of governmental immunity. 88
In many states the child protective agency, as a political subdivision8 of the state, is immune from suit for negligence if it was act-

ing within its discretion when the injury occurred. 9 Discretionary
functions have been defined as those made at planning or policy

levels, not at administrative or ministerial levels. 91 Whether a court
holds an agency liable for negligence may depend upon whether it

finds the agency's acts or omissions of a discretionary or ministerial
nature.
Courts have enumerated various reasons for finding the agency's
decisions a discretionary matter of public policy. In Elton v. County
of Orange,92 the court held that a CPS agency could not claim the
defense of governmental immunity because the investigation, placement and supervision of abused children were not basic policy decisions. In Elton, a dependent child sought damages for emotional and
physical injuries inflicted by foster parents through the agency's negligence in supervising the foster home. The court held that discre-

tionary actions would include, for example, recommending a child be
declared independent. However, the court noted that subsequent
ministerial acts that implement discretionary decisions-such as
checking up on the child's status in a foster home-do not rise to the
same level. In order to qualify for immunity, the court held that the
agency must demonstrate that a policy decision took place in which

risks and advantages were balanced.9"
Other courts have presented a sound rationale for holding those
88. See supra note 87.
89. A political subdivision is a division of the state made by proper authorities for the
purpose of carrying out a portion of those functions of the state which have always been regarded as public. State ex. rel. Marsano v. Mitchell, 155 Conn. 256, -, 231 A.2d 539, 542
(1968).
90. The Federal Tort Claims Act as well as some state tort claims acts provide exceptions to the general rule of tort liability of the federal or state government. An exception is
frequently provided for acts or omissions which are within the "discretionary function or duty"
of an agency. See, e.g., Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485, 475 P.2d 78 (1969) (court held that
persons acting as agents of government bodies are immune under common law from tort liability for conduct involving discretionary acts or functions).
91. In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 393 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), the court summarized the distinctions made between ministerial
and discretionary acts as follows: "[It is] discretionary to undertake fire-fighting, lighthouse,
rescue or wrecked-ship marking services, but not discretionary to conduct such operations negligently; discretionary to admit a patient to an army hospital, but not discretionary to treat the
patient in a negligent manner; discretionary to establish a post office at a particular location
but not to negligently fail to establish handrails; discretionary to establish control towers at
airports and to undertake air traffic separation, but not to conduct the same negligently."
92. 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970).
93. Id.

same duties to be discretionary in nature. In Pickett v. Washington
County,9 4 the court found an agency caseworker immune from liability for acts and omissions relating to the supervision, care, and custody of a child. In deciding whether the agency's acts were discretionary, the court considered the importance of the government
function involved and the extent to which governmental liability
might impair the exercise of that function. The court found that the
government, acting through child welfare agencies, had undertaken
an important function when it placed children in foster care. The
court held that the agent employed by the government to implement
this function is the caseworker, who continually must make complex
judgments. These judgments require weighing risks that could hinder
the child's development. The court held that decisions of this nature
are highly discretionary and should not be subject to scrutiny by
courts.
The designation of an agency's actions as discretionary or ministerial is a public policy decision, apparently largely based on notions
of proximate cause. Agency employees can only be expected to forestall dangerous situations that are reasonably foreseeable. Courts
seem to measure the degree of foreseeability that could be expected
of the agency in relation to the type of injury involved. Based on this
degree of foreseeability, courts decide whether or not agency decisions were discretionary and thus deserving of immunity. Court usually hold an agency's activities to be ministerial in cases in which the
child has been severely injured or killed and the agency's negligence
is alarmingly obvious. 9 5 Conversely, courts hold an agency's decision
to be discretionary in cases involving minor injuries and weaker state
controls. 96
b. Proximate Cause.-Naturally, an agency should not be
held liable for every injury suffered by a child at the hands of its
foster parents. Common law notions of proximate cause require that
legal responsibility be limited to cases where the causes are sufficiently connected with the result, such that the law may justifiably
impose liability.97 Most courts have held the connection between the
agency's acts or omissions and the child's injury sufficiently connected if the agency knew98 or should have known99 of the foster
94. 31 Or. App. 1263, 572 P.2d 1070 (1977).
95. See, e.g., Bartels v. County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906
(1980).
96. See, e.g., Pickett v. Washington County, 31 Or. App. 1263, 572 P.2d 1070 (1977).
97. Prosser, supra note 73, at 237.
98. Hanson v. Rowe, 18 Ariz. App. 131, 500 P.2d 916 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Coyle, 160 Pa. 36, 28 A. 634 (1894); Bartel v. County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, 429
N.Y.S.2d 906 (1980).
99. Vonner v. State, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973); Commonwealth v. Coyle, 160 Pa. 36,

parent's abuse.
Proving that an agency employee knew or should have known
that his actions would lead to the injury suffered by the child is a
frequent roadblock to a negligence claim. Many courts required
proof that the agency actually knew of the foster parents' violent
proclivities and failed to safeguard against them. 100 This standard
was espoused in the earliest reported case of agency liability, Commonwealth v. Coyle.' ° In Coyle, the county director of the poor was
held liable for the negligent discharge of his duty in the care and
placement of a seven-year-old child. The director had been warned
of the foster father's cruelty, as evidenced by his treatment of other
foster children. The court found the agency liable for knowingly permitting a child in its care to be grossly maltreated.
Courts hold that prior knowledge of a foster parent's propensity
for violence does not necessarily mean actual knowledge. Some
courts have supported a cause of action when the agency is put on
sufficient notice that a child's health and safety is endangered.1 02 In
Vonner v. State,03 the Department of Welfare was given notice of
possible maltreatment when two of the four foster children placed in
the Vonner home ran away, claiming they had been beaten regularly. The natural mother had also complained that her children
were being abused by the foster parents. Yet in the face of such
notice, welfare workers refused to investigate these complaints and
circumstances of abuse. The Vonner court held that the element of
proximate cause was established by the continuous course of beatings over an extended period that could and should have been discovered in the conscientious performance of the department's visitation
duties. 4
Because requisite foreseeability for proving proximate cause is
difficult to establish, the court may find liability in only those cases
of grossly inadequate performance by the agency. Courts have begun
to recognize problems facing a plaintiff in trying to bring a legitimate negligence claim against an agency. Accordingly, some courts
have made efforts to mitigate the plaintiffs burden of showing prior
knowledge. In Hanson v. Rome,10 5 for example, a surviving parent
brought suit against a child protective agency for the death of one
child and personal injuries to a second child at the hands of foster
parents. The plaintiffs cause of action hinged on proving that the
28 A. 634
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

(1894).
See supra note 98.
160 Pa. 36, 28 A. 634 (1894).
See supra note 99.
273 So.2d 252 (La. 1973).
Vonner, 273 So. 2d at 255.
18 Ariz. App. 131, 500 P.2d 916 (1972).

state had placed the two children in the home with knowledge of the
foster parents' violent proclivities. In order to prove this, the plaintiff
sought discovery of the name and address of other parents whose
children had been placed in the same foster home. The state argued
that such disclosure would violate federal regulations requiring confidentiality of records.106 The court authorized discovery of the names
and addresses despite federal regulations, because without such discovery the knowledge requirement would be insurmountable. The
court reasoned that upholding difficulties faced by plaintiffs attempting to prove an agency's prior knowledge would only encourage lack1
adaisical supervision by the agency over its foster care program. 07
Generally, courts have failed to find sufficient proximate cause
when a child's injury resulted from foster parents' negligence, rather
than from their intentional abuse. 08 The decision in Parker v. St.
Christopher'sHome'0 9 illustrates this point. In Parker,the court re-

fused to hold a child welfare agency vicariously liable for a child's
injuries, caused by a foster parent's negligent failure to prevent the
child from spilling coffee on herself. The court held that the foster
parents' control over the child was sufficiently independent from the
agency to protect the agency from liability for unforeseeable acts of
negligence." 0 In other words, the foster parents' act of setting a cup
of hot coffee too close to the child was not sufficiently intentional to
hold the agency liable for its failure to prevent the injury.
B. Section 1983

Victims also utilize a new theory of liability to attack CPS
agencies - the civil rights violation suit.' Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act provides a remedy against any person who "[ulnder color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or
106.

42 U.S.C. § 602 allows the state to receive federal funds for foster home care if it

enacts a plan to "provide safeguards which restrict use or disclosure of information concerning
applicants and recipients to purposes directly connected with administration of aid to families
with dependent children." Id.
107. Hanson, 18 Ariz. App. at 135, 500 P.2d at 920.
108. See, e.g., Pickett v. Washington County, 31 Or. App. 1263, 572 P.2d 1070 (1977)
(court found no liability when child was injured while horseback riding after being left unattended by foster parents); Fox v. Mission of Immaculate Virgin For Protection of Homeless
and Destitute Children, 202 Misc. 478, 119 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1952) (court
rejected claim for personal injury when child fell through unguarded window in dormitory of
foster institution); Parker v. St. Christopher's Home, 77 A.D.2d 921, 431 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2nd
Dept. (1980)) (court found no cause of action against welfare agency when foster parent failed
to prevent a 13-month-old child from spilling hot coffee on herself).
109. 77 A.D.2d 921, 431 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2nd Dept. 1980).
110. Id. at 112.
1I.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated three reasons why a person may
choose to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) to override certain kinds of state laws;
(2) to provide a remedy where state law is inadequate; and (3) to provide a federal remedy
where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, is not available in practice. Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).

territory subject

. . . any citizen to the deprivation of any rights...
secured by the constitution and laws . . . [of the United States]
. . ,"I2 Section 1983 was originally enacted in response to Ku

Klux Klan activities, left uncontrolled by state and local governments in the South. 1 3 The statute created civil liability for representatives of the state who were unwilling to enforce state laws

against the Klan.
During the first decades after its enactment, cases brought
under section 1983 largely involved deprivation of voting rights. 1 "
However, the Act's coverage has since been expanded to include
cases involving other constitutional violations," s5 as well as economic
deprivations."" Most recently, section 1983 actions have appeared

the area of child protection.
Four cases of CPS agency liability under section 1983 have already been litigated." 7 Accordingly, courts have begun to outline the
requirements of a section 1983 action in the context of child welfare.

On its face, a section 1983 action requires only three elements: (1) a
state action that was (2) causally related to (3) a constitutional or
federal statutory deprivation. 1 8 But courts have added another requirement - a standard of culpability" 9 - in bringing a section

1983 action. It is this requisite state of mind that provides the greatest challenge to plaintiffs attempting to prosecute CPS agencies. Examining these four cases illustrates how courts have begun to ana-

lyze section 1983 actions in the area of child protection.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
113. For a detailed discussion of the background of § 1983, see Comment, Developments
in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
114. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S.
368 (1915).
115. Presently, the overwhelming majority of section 1983 cases arise in the context of
alleged police misconduct. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (landmark case
against police officers for making illegal search and interrogation of an innocent family).
116. See, e.g., Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946) (court found a
section 1983 cause of action in allegations of a purposeful and discriminatory denial of an
architect's permit).
117. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981); Jensen
v. Conrad (Jensen 1), 570 F. Supp. 91 (4th Cir. 1983); Jensen v. Conrad (Jensen 11), 570 F.
Supp. 114 (4th Cir. 1983); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 580 F. Supp. 796 (3d Cir.
1984).
118. See supra note 112.
119. The requisite standard of culpability in section 1983 actions is highly contested.
Before the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), courts generally read into
the section a purposeful intent requirement. Monroe overruled this requirement but left unclear the role of defendant's state of mind in section 1983 actions. For a general discussion of
the state of mind requirement of section 1983, see Comment, The Evolution of the State of
Mind Requirement of Section 1983, 47 TUL. L. REV. 870 (1973).

1. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services.-Doe v.
New York City Dep't of Social Services120 is the only case in which
the court upheld a cause of action under section 1983, in the context
of child protection. The plaintiff, Anna Doe, had been abused by her
foster father for more than six years.12 1 The child welfare agency
never became aware of the extent of Anna's abuse until six years
after the abuse ceased because, Anna alleged, the agency failed to
make thorough period investigations, in compliance with its statutory
12
duties. 1
In Doe, the court did not question Anna's allegation that her
constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated. Rather, the court concentrated on the elements of causation and culpability. The court
pointed out two fundamental requisites for imposing section 1983 liability: (1) omissions must have been a substantial factor leading to
the denial of a constitutionally protected liberty interest; and (2) officials in charge of the agency being sued must have displayed a
mental state of "deliberate indifference.""" The Doe court discussed
the deliberate indifference requirement, suggesting that gross negligence"" creates a strong presumption of deliberate indifference. The
court defined gross negligence as a state of mind between ordinary
negligence and purposive intent.
The court further elaborated that deliberate indifference could
be inferred not only when gross negligence is found, but also when
the plaintiff establishes a pattern of defendant's failure to perform
statutory duties." 25 The court found that the more a statute or regulation clearly mandates a specific course of conduct, the more it furnishes a plausible basis for inferring an agency's deliberate indifference from its failure to act, even without specific knowledge of the
risk." 6 In Doe, the Catholic Home Bureau's failure to perform its
statutory duties was held indicative of a pervasive pattern on indifference to the plaintiff's welfare." 7 In order to prove her allegation
120. Doe, 649 F.2d at 140.
121. Id. at 145.
122. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 413 (McKinney 1970) (duty to report child abuse); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 376, 378 (McKinney 1970) (duty to inspect periodically and annually
recertify foster homes).
123. Doe, 649 F.2d at 140.
124. Gross negligence has been defined as "indifference to present legal duty and utter
forgetfulness of legal obligations, so far as other persons may be affected, [and] a . . . mani-

festly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a
141 N.E. 585, 586 (1923).
person of ordinary prudence." Burke v. Cook, 246 Mass. 518, -,
125. It is not violation of a statute per se that creates section 1983 liability, but rather
injury to a constitutionally protected interest or violation of a constitutional right combined
with requisite state of mind. Id.
126. Doe, 649 F.2d at 138.
127. Id.

of deliberate indifference, plaintiff sought discovery of the agency's
policies, practices and procedures for ensuring child protection." 8
Plaintiff also sought information pertaining to other foster children
handled by the agency. The Doe court held that discovery of official
agency policy should be denied because the prospect of the agency
having a policy encouraging child abuse was too remote. 29 However,
the court held that discovery of the agency's actions in other cases of
foster care should be permitted in order to allow plaintiffs to expose
patterns of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference. 3 '
The decision in Doe is important because it opens a new avenue
of redress for victims who suffer from inadequate protection by a
CPS agency.'' Damage actions like the one in Doe have significant
potential for increasing accountability of agencies and their employees. Further, Doe provides authority for discovery reaching beyond
the scope of the individual plaintiff's circumstances. Such discovery
is vital because the plaintiff will have a greater chance of maintaining a cause of action if he can prove that the agency's failure to
prevent abuse was not an isolated incident.' 32 Moreover the Doe
court's extensive definition of deliberate indifference' 33 as the appropriate standard of culpability should lend considerable guidance to
litigants in pleading and proving similar claims.
2. Retreat from Doe.-Since Doe, three courts have examined
section 1983 liability of CPS agencies.' These courts have accepted
the Doe analysis, in form, by analyzing the defendant's culpability in
terms of deliberate indifference. These decisions also reflect a substantive rejection of Doe, however, because in substance they make
deliberate indifference an insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs attempting to establish a cause of action under section 1983. Furthermore, these subsequent decisions have narrowed Doe's scope, thus
reconstructing the barriers Doe promised to eradicate.
128. The district court had barred such discovery and had excluded portions of an
agency memorandum asserting that supervisory agencies were not meeting their responsibilities to report abuse of foster children. Id. at 147.
129. Official policy which demonstrates the requisite degree of culpability has been recognized as a possible basis for liability in section 1983 actions. See Monell v. Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
130. The court noted that a compelling reason for allowing limited discovery of agency
action in other cases is provided by the rationale of Bishop v. Stoneham, 508 F.2d 1224 (2d
Cir. 1974). In Bishop the court stated that "a series of incidents closely related in time, within
several months [for example], may disclose a pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference ...
" Id. at 1226.
131. See infra notes 138-146.
132. For a discussion of "deliberate indifference" see supra text accompanying notes
123-133.
133. Id.
134. See Jensen (Jensen I), 570 F. Supp. at 91; Jensen (Jensen I), 570 F. Supp. at 114,
Bailey, 580 F. Supp. at 794.

a. Jensen v. Conrad (Jensen I).-The first section 1983 child
abuse case brought subsequent to Doe was Jensen v. Conrad (Jensen
I).135 Jensen, administratrix of the estate of Sylvia Brown, brought
action against the South Carolina Department of Social Services for
its deprivation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to life through
failure to protect Brown from physical abuse inflicted by her parents.
The complaint was dismissed in its entirety because of qualified immunity granted the agency. The court applied the United States Supreme Court standard for qualified immunity, 136 which shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not
violate "clearly established" 13 7 statutory or constitutional rights. The
Jensen I court dismissed the case because although state statutes
outlined general responsibilities of the agency at the time of its alleged misconduct, the statutes did not clearly state3 8 that breach of
the agency's duties would give rise to liability under section 1983.
However, the court noted that Doe postdated the agency's conduct,
thereby implying that Doe may abolish the immunity defense in subsequent section 1983 actions.
In a supplemental opinion issued four months later, however,
the Jensen I court explained that even with abrogation of qualified
immunity, no cause of action would be recognized. Most important
to future litigants was the court's finding that the nexus' 9 between
the state and the abuser was too tenuous to hold the agency liable.
The court distinguished Doe by pointing out that in Doe a sufficient
nexus was established because the child abuser - the foster parent
was subject to direct state regulation. In Jensen I, however, the
court held that no such nexus existed because natural parents are not
obligated to accept agency supervision. The Jensen I court further
135. 570 F. Supp. 91 (4th Cir. 1983).
136. The doctrine of qualified immunity from suit available to public officials was recently articulated in the decision of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). There, the
Court stated: " . . . government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutes or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at
810.
137. If the law at the time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably

be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to "know"
that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful . .

.

.If the law was clearly

established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public
official should know the law governing his conduct. Id. at 811.
138. The Court noted that whether or not a federal constitutional right is "clearly established" at the time of the alleged wrongful acts depends on a review of appropriate appellate
courts' decisions. Although the plaintiff drew attention to the 1981 case of Doe v. New York
City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), Doe was decided subsequent to the
acts complained of herein.
139. In 1982, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed an essential dichotomy between state action and private conduct in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). The Court
held that "the complaining party must show that there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be
fairly treated as that of the state itself." Id. at 351.

distinguished Doe because it involved a child in the state's legal custody. 40 Thus, Jensen I effectively narrowed the scope of Doe by confining Doe's applicability to cases in which the state has taken custody of the child.
b. Jensen v. Conrad (Jensen II).-In Jensen v. Conrad (Jensen
11)

14 1

a different Fourth Circuit District Court echoed the finding of

the Jensen I court that no cause of action under section 1983 would
be recognized. In Jensen II the county department of social services
failed to investigate thoroughly a report of child abuse. A department caseworker had decided, after interviewing the child, that its
family should be contacted. However, the caseworker failed to locate
the home and, after two months, classified the case as officially
closed. The child died shortly thereafter, and the agency was
charged with failure to properly train its workers. The Jensen II
court accepted the Doe standard of culpability, but applied the "deliberate indifference" 14 2 test to effectively close the door to the plaintiff. The court held that in order to prove deliberate indifference the
plaintiff must show that the agency was aware of serious inadequacies in the agency training program which posed known risks to the
plaintiff. Further, the court held that the plaintiff must show that the
agency declined to remedy the inadequacy.
The court noted that plaintiff could raise a rebuttable presumption of deliberate indifference by showing a pattern of agency violations, or by showing the agency's gross negligence. But, according to
the court, plaintiff's evidence that the agency failed to locate the
child's home was not sufficient to prove the requisite intent for a
section 1983 action.143 The court found that even though the agency
had received two separate reports of abuse and then had failed to
thoroughly investigate them, plaintiff had not established deliberate
indifference. Thus, Jensen II demonstrates that unless a plaintiff can
clearly show a pattern of malfeasance or culpability close to actual
intent, misconduct by the agency will go unrectified under section
1983.
c. Estate of Bailey v. County of York.-The most recent case
examining CPS agency liability under section 1983 is Estate of Bai140. The court stated that "while the state and county officials may have been under a
legal duty to offer protective services to the custodians of abused children, absent legal custody
of a child by the state, the officials had no general duty to unequivocally ensure the safety of
that child twenty-four hours a day." Jensen 1, 570 F. Supp. at 110.
141. 570 F. Supp. 114 (4th Cir. 1983). Although cited under the same name as the case
previously discussed, this case - Jensen H1- was brought by the administratrix of a different
child whose situation was entirely different than that in Jensen .
142. See supra note 132.
143. Jensen 11, 570 F. Supp. at 120.

ley v. County of York. 144 In Bailey, an agency had taken custody of
a child who had been abused by her mother's boyfriend. The agency
had decided subsequently to return the child to her mother and to
demand that the boyfriend move out of the mother's home. After the
child was killed by the boyfriend, an action was brought against the
agency for failing to discover that the boyfriend had continued to
reside with the mother. In Bailey, the court followed the lead of Jensen p45 by distinguishing Doe because it involved a child over which
the state had actual legal custody. The Bailey court said that because the child's death was caused by a private individual and not
the state, the requisite nexus 146 between the state actor and the
child's death did not exist. The court did not discuss the fact that the
state agency had custody and subsequently decided to return the
child to a potentially unsafe environment. Rather, Bailey seems to
fortify the holding in Jensen I that Doe's application is limited to
those cases in which the CPS agency has legal custody of the child.
V.

Conclusion

The debate concerning CPS agency liability transcends particular theories under which litigants seek to hold such agencies accountable. Analysis of causes of action and their attendant barriers to recovery reflects the tension between the rights of the abused child and
those of CPS agencies facing resource shortages and financial cutbacks. Should the law hold agency employees liable for malfeasance
and nonfeasance which may ultimately be caused by state and federal budgetary constraints? And if such liability is desirable, how
egregious must misconduct be to sustain a cause of action against
CPS agencies? These are precisely the questions which courts will
address in the near future.
Presently, courts have begun to formulate CPS agency liability
grounded on two bases: standard negligence claims and civil rights
actions. Although courts seem prepared to adopt these causes of action for either gross agency misconduct or extreme cases of child
abuse, it remains unclear whether they will extend these theories to
incorporate more moderate forms of misfeasance or abuse. The embryonic stage of this area of litigation, however, should not relegate
notions of CPS agency liability to idle speculation. As growing public awareness spawns further scrutiny of CPS agency practices, con144.
145.
146.

580 F. Supp. 794 (3d Cir. 1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 134-140.
See supra note 139.

tinuing judicial forays into such liability will become increasingly
important to the attorney litigating in this field.
Shelly Urban

